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 2 
Introduction 
Recent years have not been kind to structures and processes 
promoting collective solutions to problems of Irish labour market regulation. 
The long-term decline in trade union density has weakened the traditional role 
of unions as regards workplace representation and in some sectors of the 
economy (for example, amongst the important Multinational Corporation 
sector or in “high value” services like information technology) unions barely 
register a presence at all.1 From around 2004, a number of long-established 
indigenous companies began to engage in hitherto inconceivable conduct by 
effectively snubbing the State’s dispute resolution agencies; Sheehan 
recounts a number of instances where major Irish companies rejected 
pressure to resolve disputes from agencies such as the Labour Relations 
Commission (LRC) and the National Implementation Body (NIB), and ignored 
non-binding recommendations of the Labour Court.2 In 2007, the Supreme 
Court in Ryanair v The Labour Court3 effectively neutered legislation enacted 
allowing members to be represented by their trade union in workplaces where 
the employer did not recognise the union for the purposes of collective 
bargaining. In a pointed rebuke, the Court criticised the Labour Court’s 
“mindset”, which, in interpreting the meaning of “collective bargaining” 
favoured the way particular expressions are used and particular activities are 
carried out by trade unions.4 The enactment of legislation seeking to promote 
better collective information and consultation practices in Irish workplaces, the 
Employees (Provision of Information and Consultation) Act 2006, has, as 
commentators predicted, proven to have had little, if any, impact.5 The 
economic, political and social crisis that has dominated the Irish landscape 
since 2008 has also claimed the once-lauded model of Irish social 
partnership, which collapsed in 2010, amid much recrimination and rancour.6 
This article focuses on another recent development in relation to 
collective regulation of the labour market, the challenge to the operation of the 
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Joint Labour Committee (JLC) system. The article has two principal 
objectives. First, it outlines and analyses the background to recent disputes 
relating to the operation of the JLC system, culminating in the constitutional 
challenge to its legitimacy in the High Court case of John Grace Fried Chicken 
Ltd & Ors v Catering Joint Labour Committee & Ors.7 The article examines the 
High Court decision in the case and the legislative reform proposals made as 
a consequence. Secondly, the article sets the JLC story in the wider context 
of shifts in labour market regulation at European Union (EU) level, arguing 
that the challenges to the JLC system are consistent with general trends 
militating against collective approaches to regulation, and which prioritise 
legally binding minimum standards over bargained terms and conditions of 
employment. The article proceeds as follows. The next section explains the 
operation of the JLC system and locates it within the Irish industrial relations 
model. The article goes on to describe why the validity of the JLC system 
began to be questioned and the reasons giving rise to challenges to it before 
the Superior Courts. The article then looks at the decision of the High Court in 
the John Grace case and analyses the reforms to the system proposed in the 
Industrial Relations Amendment (No. 3) Bill 2011. Before concluding, the 
article then looks at how the challenge to the JLC system is reflective of 
broader trends in labour market regulation under Irish, and EU, law.  
 
Bargain Town: Joint Labour Committees and 
Employment Rights 
The Irish system of employment relations, derived as it is from that of 
the UK, has traditionally been classified as “voluntarist”, where the preference 
is for joint trade union and employer regulation of employment relations and 
the relative absence of legal intervention.8 Voluntarism is premised on 
freedom of contract and freedom of association, whereby the employment 
relationship is essentially regulated by free collective bargaining between 
worker and employer representative groups.9 In such a model, the role of the 
State is seen to be primarily to provide a supportive framework for collective 
bargaining and the “principal purpose of labour law is to regulate, support and 
restrain the power of management and organised labour”.10 The implications 
of this are that Irish (and British) employers and unions traditionally viewed 
employment legislation with disfavour, so that collective bargaining was the 
key element in the functioning of the employment relations system. However, 
collective bargaining in the Irish system has always been voluntary in that 
there is no obligation on employers to recognise a trade union for collective 
bargaining purposes and collective agreements are generally not legally 
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binding.11 Agreements are enforced through industrial relations (IR) 
negotiations and, if necessary through displays of IR “muscle” (strikes or lock-
outs, for example). Collective bargaining in Ireland, thus, is seen as 
normative; collective agreements are usually not legally enforceable, as they 
do not generally intend to create legal relations,12 and as a rule, only the 
parties to an agreement are bound by its terms.13 Collectively agreed terms 
may be incorporated, impliedly or expressly, into individual contracts of 
employment,14 but only where such terms are apt or suitable for 
incorporation.15 
There are some important exceptions to this general rule. Collective 
agreements can be given legal effect if such agreements are registered with 
the Labour Court. Under section 25 of the Industrial Relations Act 1946, an 
“employment agreement” is defined as: 
 
…an agreement relating to the remuneration or the conditions of 
employment of workers of any class, type or group made between a 
trade union of workers and an employer or trade union of employers or 
made, at a meeting of a registered joint industrial council, between 
members of the council representative of workers and members of the 
council representative of employers.16 
 
Under section 27 of the 1946 Act, any party to such an employment 
agreement can apply to the Labour Court to register the agreement. There are 
currently 74 Registered Employment Agreements (REAs) on the Register 
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required to be maintained by the Labour Court.17 Registered agreements 
apply to all employers and employees working in a particular sector or 
industry irrespective of whether such employers or employees were, in fact, 
parties to the agreement or wished to be subject to its terms.18 Although 
individual contracts of employment of workers subject to REAs can provide for 
terms and conditions in excess of those stipulated, such contracts cannot 
contain terms less favourable to workers. Thus, REAs are particularly suited 
to, and indeed conceived in terms of, labour intensive industries where labour 
costs form a large portion of overall costs.19 The rationale behind REAs is to 
ensure uniform minimum standards apply across the relevant industry in order 
to prevent a “race to the bottom” amongst employers, who may seek to 
compete by cutting labour costs.  
The other principal exception to the general rule that parties in an 
employment relationship are not bound by contractual terms to which they 
have not expressly agreed, relates to terms and conditions of employment laid 
down in Employment Regulation Orders (EROs).20 Joint Labour Committees 
(JLCs) are statutory bodies established under Part IV of the Industrial 
Relations Acts 1946-2004 to provide for the fixing of minimum rates of pay 
and the regulation of employment.21 They typically exist in employments 
where there is little or no collective bargaining and are designed to protect 
vulnerable workers. The Labour Court has the power, under section 35 of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1946, to establish such bodies, on the application of 
the Minister, a trade union, or any organisation or group of persons claiming 
to be representative of a group of workers or employers.22 The Court must be 
satisfied, before making an establishment order that, in respect of an 
application by an organisation or a group of persons claiming to be 
representative of workers or employers, that the claim is well-founded. 
Furthermore, there must be either substantial agreement between such 
workers and their employers to the establishment of a joint labour committee 
or the Court must be satisfied that the existing machinery for effective 
regulation of remuneration and other conditions of employment of such 
workers is inadequate or is likely to cease or to cease to be adequate or the 
Court must be satisfied, having regard to the existing rates of remuneration or 
conditions of employment of such workers or any of them, it is expedient that 
a joint labour committee should be established.23 
A JLC comprises of an independent chairperson appointed by the 
Minister and representative members (of such number as the Labour Court 
thinks fit) of employers and employees following consultation with the social 
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partners. The most important function of a JLC is to submit proposals to the 
Labour Court on fixing minimum wages and regulating conditions of 
employment for workers covered.24 If such proposals are confirmed by the 
Labour Court, through the making of an ERO, they become binding terms, 
which employers are not permitted to undercut in the contract of 
employment.25 Where a worker’s contract provides for less than the terms of 
an ERO, the ERO terms are effectively read into the contract and replace the 
provisions relating to pay and/or conditions contained therein.26 Failure by an 
employer to comply with the terms of an ERO is an offence and, on 
conviction, the employer can be ordered to alter the terms and conditions of 
the employee in question, as well as compensate him or her for the period of 
employment in which terms and conditions fell below the ERO minimum.27 
The worker can also issue civil proceedings on his or her own behalf, or under 
section 49 of the Industrial Relations Act 1990, an inspector can institute such 
proceedings, on behalf of a worker.28  
This, at least, was the position up until the summer of 2011 and the 
decision of the High Court in John Grace Fried Chicken Ltd & Ors v Catering 
Joint Labour Committee & Ors,29 which declared the provisions of the 1946 
Act, allowing the Labour Court to confirm the EROs as binding on all 
employers in the catering sector, to be unconstitutional. The decision is 
discussed in detail below, but first it is important to address the issues leading 
up to the taking of the case. In particular, it is important to set the issue of 
EROs in the context of broader developments in Irish labour market 
regulation.  
 
Hotels, Shops and Bailouts: The Pressure for Reform 
The validity of EROs had been tested before the Irish Superior Courts 
in the late 1970s, in the case of Burke v Minister for Labour.30 The issue 
before the Supreme Court was whether the manner of the making of the ERO 
in question was tainted with invalidity.  Henchy J, in describing the power 
delegated to JLCs to make proposals to the Labour Court for fixing statutory 
minimum wages, stated:  
 
It will be seen, therefore, that the power to make a minimum-
remuneration order is a delegated power of a most fundamental, 
permissive and far-reaching kind. By the above provisions of the Act of 
1946 Parliament, without reserving to itself a power of supervision or a 
power of revocation or cancellation (which would apply if the order had 
to be laid on the table of either House before it could have statutory 
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effect) has vested in a joint labour committee and the Labour Court the 
conjoint power to fix minimum rates of remuneration so that non-
payment thereof will render employers liable to conviction and fine and 
(in the case of conviction) to being made compellable by court order to 
pay the amount fixed by the order of the Labour Court. Not alone is this 
power given irrevocably and without parliamentary, or even ministerial, 
control, but once such an order is made (no matter how erroneous, ill-
judged or unfair it may be) a joint labour committee is debarred from 
submitting proposals for revoking or amending it until it has been in 
force for at least six months. While the parent statute may be amended 
or repealed at any time, the order, whose authors are not even the 
direct delegates of Parliament, must stand irrevocably in force for well 
over six months.31 
 
As a result, Henchy J held that JLCs must exercise their functions, not only 
with constitutional propriety and due regard to natural justice, but also within 
the framework of the terms and objects of the Act and with basic fairness, 
reasonableness and good faith. The Supreme Court clearly indicted unease 
with the scope of the powers delegated to JLCs and the Labour Court. 
Henchy J, first, pointed to the fact that apart from the “skeletal provisions” in 
the second schedule to the Act of 1946 as to its constitution, officers and 
proceedings, the Act was silent as to how a committee was to carry out its 
functions in making an order, and, secondly, referred to the Hotels JLC in 
question as “an unelected body, functioning behind closed doors”.32 The 
Supreme Court held that the order in this case had been made ulta vires the 
Labour Court and was void, as the JLC, in making the proposals, had failed to 
satisfy the requirement of basic fairness.  
For many years after the judgment in Burke, little attention was focused 
on the operation of JLCs or the legitimacy of the JLC system. However, this 
state of affairs has altered dramatically in recent years, and particularly since 
the economic climate began to worsen in 2007. All of a sudden, the hitherto 
relatively obscure workings of the JLCs began to become the focus of 
widespread public interest and debate. Employers and their representative 
groups, in particular, began to rigorously question the rationale for continuing 
with the JLC system.33 This questioning was founded on a number of related 
arguments, which may be summarised as follows.  
First, it was argued that the JLC system had become fragmented and 
unwieldy and, in certain cases, illogical. The JLC for the Brush and Broom 
sector, for example, had not made a proposal to the Labour Court for an ERO 
since 1994. In some sectors, EROs varied depending on seemingly arbitrary, 
often historical, geographical demarcations. So for example, JLCs for the 
Contract Cleaning sector were divided into those covering Dublin and the rest 
of the country, for the Catering sector into those covering Dublin and Dun 
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Laoghaire and the rest of the country, whilst in the Hairdressing sector, one 
JLC covered Cork City and one covered Dublin, Dun Laoghaire and Bray.   
Secondly, it was argued that the entire raison d’être for JLCs had 
become redundant. Unlike in the 1940s, when the system had been 
established, extensive protective legislation, covering all workers, is now in 
place (notably rhw National Minimum Wage Act 2000 and the Organisation of 
Working Time Act 1997). Unsurprisingly, as the economic climate worsened, 
arguments based on cost were increasingly proffered. A particular source of 
employer criticism focused on overtime and unsocial hours rates. So, in the 
retail sector, for example, the relevant ERO provided for time-and-a-half to be 
paid where overtime was worked up until midnight and for time-and-a-third to 
be paid to all those working on Sundays. Given that Sunday opening is now 
overwhelmingly the norm in the sector, employers argued that Sunday should 
be treated as any other working day. Further criticism was focused on the fact 
that a normal working week under the retail ERO was stipulated to be 39 
hours (as against the maximum of 48 permitted under the Organisation of 
Working Time Act 1997). The cost to employers of the JLC system was said 
to be so significant that Retail Excellence Ireland, the largest retail industry 
trade body in Ireland,  maintained that scrapping the system (in addition to 
reforming laws on rent reviews) would save nearly 43,000 jobs and create an 
additional 31,840 in the sector.34 
From 2008, in particular, the JLC (and, indeed, the related REA) 
system began to come under sustained attack on a number of fronts. In 2008, 
a group of hoteliers challenged a decision of the Labour Court to approve JLC 
proposals for a minimum wage for 25,000 staff in the hotel sector. The 
applicants sought a declaration that the provisions of sections 42 and 43 of 
the Industrial Relations Act 1946 and section 48 of the Industrial Relations Act 
1990 were invalid as they allowed an impermissible delegation of legislative 
functions (the setting of minimum wages) to a body other than the Oireachtas 
and on the grounds that they unduly interfered with constitutionally protected 
property rights.35 The case was ultimately decided on procedural grounds and 
the constitutional challenge did not proceed.  
A twist in the saga came about as a result of Ireland’s financial and 
banking crisis and the subsequent need for financial support from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the EU. The Memorandum of 
Understanding outlining the terms of a financial support package for Ireland 
included a specific commitment to review the REA and JLC systems with 
follow-up actions to be agreed with the European Commission. 36 The review, 
carried out jointly by Labour Court chairman Kevin Duffy and labour 
economist Dr Frank Walsh was published in May 2010 and recommended 
reform, rather than abolition, of the systems.37 In response to some of the 
criticisms levelled at the JLC system outlined above, it is interesting to note 
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the report’s conclusions. The report found that the system was in need of 
significant overhaul, that the number of JLCs should be reduced and 
geographical distinctions abolished, and that terms and conditions of 
employment regarding overtime payments, including the conditions under 
which they become payable, and Sunday premium should be standardised 
across the various JLCs.38 The report, though, rejected the argument that 
lowering the basic JLC rates to the level of the minimum wage rate was likely 
to have a substantial effect on employment.39 It also concluded that it was not 
accurate to suggest that the body of primary employment rights legislation in 
force adequately covered matters dealt with by EROs.40 As noted above, this 
is the case, for example, in relation to working time and pay rates other than 
basic pay. The report also focused on the need, in terms of basic fairness, for 
systems of setting pay and conditions of employment that went beyond the 
statutory minimum.  
 
Fried and Battered: the ‘John Grace’ Decision 
Within weeks of the publication of the Duffy-Walsh report, the High 
Court handed down its decision in John Grace.41 The plaintiffs in the case 
were a small business in Cork city involved in the preparation and sale of fried 
chicken and other snack foods (operated by a husband and wife) and an 
organisation calling itself the “Quick Food Alliance” (set up for the purposes of 
representing the interests of the businesses and persons involved in the quick 
food service industry). In essence, the plaintiffs claimed that the provisions of 
the Industrial Relations Acts 1946 and 1990 allowing JLCs and the Labour 
Court to set terms and conditions of employment in the catering sector were 
unconstitutional and that the 2008 ERO made by the Labour Court was invalid 
as a consequence.42 Feeney J, in an unequivocal judgment, ruled that the 
provisions of the 1946 Act, allowing the Labour Court to confirm the EROs as 
binding on all employers in the catering sector, were unconstitutional as they 
allowed an impermissible delegation of legislative powers (the setting of the 
rate of remuneration and conditions of employment for the sector) to a body 
other than the Oireachtas without dealing with how, or on what basis, such 
powers should be exercised. Feeney J referred to the “far reaching nature of 
the delegation within the 1946 Act” identified by Henchy J. in Burke43 and 
found that the “absoluteness of the delegation which he identified remains 
unaltered”.44 The Court ruled that the 1946 Act allowed all choices and 
decisions as to the rates of remuneration and conditions of employment to be 
made by a delegated body (the Labour Court, on a proposal from the JLC) 
without providing any identification of the principles or policies upon which that 
body should act (e.g. what factors should be taken into account in deciding an 
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 Ibid, at 78-79.  
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appropriate rate of pay) and without providing for any parliamentary power of 
supervision in terms of revocation or cancellation.45  
In addition, the Court ruled that a system allowing EROs to set wages 
and conditions for employees in one geographical area, when significantly 
different wage rates and conditions applied in an immediate adjoining area, 
without any identifiable basis for such discrimination, and where failure to 
comply could result in criminal prosecution, was arbitrary and unfair and 
amounted to an unlawful interference of the plaintiff’s property rights.46 The 
Court, therefore, concluded that the provisions of sections 42, 43 and 45 of 
the 1946 Act and section 48 of the 1990 Act were invalid having regard to the 
provisions of Article 15.2.1 of the Constitution and granted the plaintiffs a 
declaration that the 2008 ERO was invalid.  
The decision, predictably, was welcomed by employer representative 
groups, with many calling for the abolition of the JLC system in its entirety.47 
Trade unions, meanwhile, expressed concerns that following the ruling, 
workers in the catering sector, and indeed in other sectors covered by EROs, 
would have their terms and conditions of employment downgraded.48  
However, the Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation moved swiftly to 
pledge new legislation to re-establish, with significant reforms, the JLC 
system; the result is the Industrial Relations (Amendment) (No 3) Bill 2011.  
 
A Healthy Alternative? The Industrial Relations 
(Amendment) (No 3) Bill 2011 
The Bill seeks to address the criticisms of the JLC system summarised 
above, as well as the problems identified by Feeney J in the High Court.49 
First, section 11 inserts a new section 41A into the 1946 Act, which provides 
that the Labour Court is to undertake a review of all existing JLCs and may 
recommend that a JLC be either abolished, amended or amalgamated with 
another.50 Such reviews are then to be carried out every five years. In carrying 
out its reviews, the Labour Court is to have regard to factors including the 
classes of workers and businesses affected and the extent to which they have 
been affected by changes in a given sector, the impact of an ERO on 
employment levels, whether the ERO has been prejudicial to the exercise of 
collective bargaining in the sector and, addressing the question of 
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geographical demarcations, the need for continued regional representation, 
where it exists.  
Section 12 of the Bill inserts a new section 42A into the 1946 Act, 
which allows for JLCs to set a basic adult rate and two additional higher rates 
relating to length of service in the sector or business. This represents a 
significant reduction in the number of different rates previously in place. New 
Section 42A(5) explicitly links subminimum rates under EROs with those 
under the National Minimum Wage Act 2000, in respect of employees aged 
under 18 years, first time job entrants, and employees undergoing training. 
New section 42A(7) provides that compensation for Sunday working will now 
be regulated by section 14 of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997 and 
not set by EROs.  
A number of measures in the Bill seek to address criticisms proffered 
by employer groups (though not, as noted above, universally accepted) that 
EROs impose excessive costs on business. So, JLCs will no longer set 
Sunday premium rates, or make orders covering pay or time-off from work in 
lieu of public holidays, payments in lieu of notice; or payments referable to a 
worker’s redundancy (new section 42A(7)).  The Minister has pledged to 
request the Labour Relations Commission to devise a new Code of Practice 
on Sunday Working to provide guidance to employers, employees and their 
representatives in sectors covered by EROs on arrangements that may be put 
in place to comply section 14 of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997. 
The Code is to be given the status of a statutory instrument by the Minister.51 
An “inability to pay” mechanism, such as exists under the minimum wage 
legislation, will also be introduced. Section 14 of the Bill inserts a new section 
48A into the 1946 Act, which sets out a detailed process by which individual 
employers can seek temporary derogation from the sector-level minimum pay 
and conditions set by EROs on grounds of financial difficulty. The maximum 
period of an exemption will be 24 months and it must be sought for a 
minimum of three months. Under new sections 48(7) and (8) an exemption 
can be sought where the employer has obtained the agreement of its workers 
or their representatives or, in the absence of agreement, where the employer 
has informed the workers of its precarious financial position and the Labour 
Court is satisfied that the employer cannot maintain the terms of the ERO, 
and compliance with its terms would result in considerable lay-offs or 
redundancies and adverse effects on the survival of the employer’s business. 
The Court is also to have regard to whether granting an exemption would 
have an adverse effect on employment levels and distort competition in the 
sector to the detriment of employers not party to the particular application, and 
to the implications of granting an exemption for the long term sustainability of 
the employer’s business (new section 48A(9)).  
Finally, the Bill seeks to address the constitutional problems with the 
JLC system outlined in the John Grace decision, in particular, that Section 42 
of the 1946 Act failed to prescribe sufficient “principles and policies” to govern 
the exercise of the powers conferred on JLCs. Section 12 of the Bill inserts a 
new section 42A into the 1946 Act, which lays down matters to which a JLC 
                                               
51
 Ibid. The Minister has also pledged that benefits in the nature of pay – including overtime – 
should be standardised across sectors either by means of a nationally agreed Social 
Partnership protocol or, failing that, a statutory Code of Practice. 
 12 
must have regard when formulating proposals for an ERO to be put to the 
Labour Court. Under new section 42A(6) these include: the general level of 
wages in comparable sectors, including, in cases where enterprises in a given 
sector are in competition with enterprises outside the State, the general level 
of wages in comparable sectors in other relevant jurisdictions; the current 
national minimum hourly rate of pay applicable under the National Minimum 
Wage Act 2000 and the appropriateness of fixing a higher statutory minimum 
hourly rate of pay; and the terms of any relevant national agreement in force. 
The JLC must also consider the legitimate interests of employers and workers 
likely to be affected by the proposals, including: 
 
the legitimate financial and commercial interests of the 
employers in the sector in question; 
the desirability of agreeing and maintaining efficient and 
sustainable work practices appropriate to the sector in question; 
the desirability of agreeing and maintaining fair and sustainable 
minimum rates of remuneration appropriate to the sector in 
question; 
the desirability of maintaining harmonious industrial relations; 
the desirability of maintaining competitiveness; and 
the levels of employment and unemployment in the sector in 
question.52 
 
Section 12 of the Bill inserts a new section 42B into the 1946 Act, 
which explicitly provides for the regulation of decision making procedures both 
by JLCs themselves, in particular the role of the Chairperson in facilitating 
agreement, and the Labour Court, including where a JLC cannot agree 
proposals to put to the Court. In such a case, the Court, in making a 
recommendation (to which the JLC Chairman must have regard in casting his 
vote in the event that the parties to the JLC cannot come to agreement) must 
consider factors such as any representations made to it, prevailing economic 
circumstances in the sector, and the remuneration and conditions of 
employment of workers in similar employment sectors. New section 42C 
introduces Parliamentary oversight into the ERO process. Following adoption 
of a proposal for an ERO by the Labour Court, the proposals will be forwarded 
to the Minister who shall either make an order giving effect to the proposals 
(laying the order before the Houses of the Oireachtas in the standard way) or 
shall refuse to make an order and shall advise the Labour Court in writing of 
the grounds for the refusal.  
Finally, an alternative enforcement mechanism is provided for (inserted 
by section 13 of the Bill into the 1946 Act) under new section 45A, where, 
instead of going to the courts, employees or their trade unions with a 
complaint against an employer can bring the complaint to a Rights 
Commissioner within six months of the contravention. Section 13 of the Bill 
also inserts a new section 45E enabling the Minister to present a complaint to 
the Rights Commissioner in circumstances where a breach of the ERO has 
occurred and it is unreasonable to expect the employee to present a 
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complaint. Such a complaint is to be treated in the same way as if it were a 
complaint from the employee. 
The 2011 Bill, then, represents an attempt by the legislature to 
reconstitute the JLC system in a manner which seeks to adapt the system to 
contemporary labour market conditions and which insulates it from 
constitutional challenge. In the next section, observations on how successful 
this attempt is likely to be are outlined. The JLC case is also placed within the 
wider context of shifts in labour market regulation, at domestic and European 
Union level.  
 
Now That the Chips are Down…Will the JLC System 
be Revived? 
The fact that the legislature has chosen to reconstitute the JLC system, 
rather than heed calls for its abolition, represents something of a departure 
from prevailing tendencies. It is submitted that at both national and EU level, a 
discernable regulatory trend can be identified in the area of employment and 
labour law, which is moving away, first, from prioritising the role of the social 
partners in negotiating and “policing” regulation of terms and conditions of 
employment and, secondly, moving towards the establishment of statutory 
minimum standards and away from bargained terms and conditions of 
employment. The introduction to this article outlined a number of 
developments by way of illustrating this point. However, whether the 2011 Bill, 
if and when enacted, will, in practice, buck this trend remains to be seen.  
First, in a number of crucial ways, the Bill may well sanction an 
imposition of statutory minimum standards. In relation to payment for Sunday 
working, this is explicit, as the provisions of the Organisation of Working Time 
Act 1997 are to replace the bargained standards that existed prior to the John 
Grace decision. Implicitly, however, what emerges in terms of remuneration 
under the reconstituted JLC system may well approximate the provisions of 
the minimum wage legislation. The “principles and policies” to be considered 
by JLCs when formulating an ERO under new section 42A(6) are extremely 
restrictive, requiring, inter alia, a consideration of the appropriateness of fixing 
a minimum hourly rate of pay that is higher than the existing statutory 
minimum wage, and of wage levels in comparable sectors in other countries 
(an issue debated almost daily by economists in the media and academic 
publications on which it is deucedly difficult to gain consensus).53 The Bill also 
provides for an ERO to establish a minimum rate of pay and no more than two 
higher rates, which are related to length of service in the sector or business, in 
order to address the argument that JLCs had previously set too many different 
rates of pay, which engendered complicity and confusion. While there is some 
merit in this argument, it does however, tend to ignore the reality that the 
fixing of pay levels by reference to skills and qualifications, as well as 
experience, is a common and long-standing feature of pay determination 
systems across Europe.  
In addition, the “inability to pay” provisions, under which individual 
exemptions can be granted to employers (for up to two years) allowing them 
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to pay a rate not lower than the statutory minimum wage, may well undermine 
the entire ERO system, by creating an uneven playing field and allowing 
employers with exemptions to undercut their competitors. The Bill attempts to 
address this by providing that exemptions should only be granted where the 
employer has obtained the agreement of workers or where the Labour Court, 
having regard to the factors in new section 48A(9), outlined above, sanctions 
the exemption. However, in terms of employee agreement, there is clearly 
scope, particularly in difficult economic times, for employers to exert pressure 
on vulnerable employees, especially where these do not have the assistance 
of a trade union or where employers do not provide full information about the 
economic position of the business. The factors to which the Labour Court 
must have regard in sanctioning an exemption in the absence of employee 
agreement, again, may prove difficult to operate in practice (whether 
compliance with the terms of an ERO would have adverse effects on the 
survival of the employer’s business, for example, or the implications of 
granting an exemption for the long term sustainability of the employer’s 
business). It is clear, too, that where one exemption is granted, the Court’s 
duty to consider possible distortions in competition in the sector in question, 
make the granting of future applications more likely.  
Secondly, the Bill confers a wide discretion on the Minister to accept or 
reject a proposed ERO. The issue of the lack of Parliamentary supervision 
identified in both the Burke and John Grace decisions clearly needed to be 
addressed in the Bill, but the legislation does appear to go further than is 
necessary in relation to the powers granted to the Minister. It may have been 
preferable if the traditional deference shown to the Labour Court by the 
Superior Courts had been reflected in the legislation by giving the Minister an 
oversight role, rather than an outright veto.54  
Finally, the Bill does make progress in relation to enforcement. Section 
18 of the Bill amends the terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994, by 
requiring that the terms of an ERO must now be included in the written 
statement of the terms of employment given to a worker under that section. 
The section also allows for prompt rectification of errors in these terms, by 
means of allowing a labour inspector to give directions to the employer 
concerned (rather than pursuing the issue through the employment tribunal 
system, as at present). Crucially, the Bill allows for civil claims, through the 
employment tribunals, to be pursued, rather than relying on criminal 
prosecution or civil actions through the regular courts (although these options 
remain).  
In terms of enforcement, however, the Bill does not – and, perhaps 
understandably, does not seek to – address a more fundamental concern. 
With the decline in trade union workplace coverage and collective dispute 
resolution, and the “explosion” in the volume of employment legislation over 
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the last 20 years or so,55 there has been a huge increase in the numbers of 
individual claims pursued in front of employment tribunals. This has been 
accompanied by a “legalisation” of employment relations in terms of the 
adoption of court-like rules and procedures and the related cost and delay 
engendered by the involvement of lawyers in what was envisaged originally 
as a relatively informal, party-driven and party-controlled dispute resolution 
system.56 The nettle of reform of the employment dispute resolution system 
has finally been grasped and the Minister has begun the process of 
revamping the system, via a wide-ranging project on Employment Rights and 
Industrial Relations Streamlining.57 The outcomes of this are eagerly awaited.  
For the purposes of this article, however, the objection remains that 
workers seeking to enforce rights under EROs, who by definition will be 
working in low-pay, low-skill employment, must pursue individual claims 
before increasingly legalistic and intimidating employment tribunals. This is a 
significant shift from the position where problems with compliance were 
historically dealt with by unions and employers via traditional industrial 
relations structures and procedures (negotiations, agreements, collective 
action, mediation via the Labour Court, etc). Indeed, one of the primary 
functions of trade unions has traditionally been to diffuse individual rights 
across memberships so that the outcome of a dispute does not end with one 
individual. Instead unions can be “an instrument in translating statute and 
case law into changed employment practice”.58 Otherwise, in the absence of a 
class-action type procedure, even where cases are brought and won, the 
impact of the law is often confined to the individual. In the absence of 
fundamental reforms of Irish trade union recognition laws and collective 
bargaining (in both union and non-union contexts), and an attempt to restore 
or revive the collectivist ethos of the system for employment dispute 
resolution, this problem will remain.59 Indeed, it is not at all clear that 
employers that refuse to recognise trade unions for bargaining purposes will 
simply accept the imposition of terms and conditions of employment (under 
EROs) negotiated by JLCs, of which trade unions are members. This may 
particularly be the case where union organisation in a sector is relatively 
weak. It remains to be seen whether controversies regarding the 
“representativeness” of the parties to an REA may yet seep their way into the 
JLC debate.60 
 Without such reform, a greater role, is demanded of, and played by, 
labour inspectorates as they take over many of the “policing” functions, 
formerly performed by the social partners. Curiously, the Bill is relatively silent 
in this regard in relation to the role of the National Employment Rights 
Authority (NERA). NERA had been active in recent times in pursuing 
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employers, through the criminal courts, for violations of ERO provisions.61 The 
Authority retains this role under the 2011 Bill, notwithstanding the 
establishment of an alternative enforcement mechanism operating through the 
employment tribunals. Indeed, in the absence of enhanced institutional 
backing for increased social partner monitoring of labour market rules, the 
resourcing of the enforcement authority remains critical. A commitment under 
the Towards 2016 social partnership agreement, under which the pledge to 
establish NERA was made, was that the number of labour inspectors would 
be trebled from 30 to 90. However, it has been reported that, because of the 
moratorium on recruitment and promotion in the public service announced in 
2009, the number of labour inspectors has actually decreased since 2007 and 
that the commitment to employ 90 inspectors has not been met.62 Thus, 
whether resources will be available for NERA to continue to enforce EROs 
remains an open question.  
 
Continental Drift: Posted Workers, the Court of Justice 
and Bargained Employment Standards 
It is submitted here that developments in Ireland are perfectly 
consistent with general trends under EU law, which also militate against 
collective approaches to labour market regulation. In a line of judgments 
relating to the Posting of Workers Directive,63 the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) has insisted on adopting an interpretation of the 
directive’s provisions that also concentrates on enforcing legally binding 
minima and reducing the scope for collectively bargained standards and 
social partner monitoring thereof. In a series of cases (commonly referred to 
as the “Laval Quartet”)  Laval, Viking, Rüffert and Luxembourg,64 the Court 
has severely restricted the rights of trade unions (and Member States) to act 
in order to protect collective agreements in cases where the rights of free 
movement of services or establishment are involved. So, in Laval, the CJEU 
ruled that the blockage of a building site by Swedish unions in order to force a 
Latvian service provider to enter into negotiations on pay and sign a collective 
agreement was illegal under EU rules on the freedom to provide services 
under Article 56TFEU (ex-Article 49EC). The Court pointed out that the 
Posting of Workers Directive does not allow the host Member State to make 
the provision of services in its territory conditional on the observance of terms 
and conditions of employment which go beyond the mandatory rules for 
minimum protection (laid down in Article 3(1) of the Directive).65 The Court 
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stated that it would be a restriction on the free movement of services if service 
providers established in another Member State were forced into negotiations 
of unspecified duration with trade unions in the host Member State in order to 
ascertain minimum wage rates and to sign a collective agreement, the terms 
of which went beyond the minimum protection guaranteed by the Directive. 
This is because it would be liable to make it less attractive, or more difficult, 
for such undertakings to carry out work in the host Member State. Thus, while 
workers posted to another Member State were entitled to avail of the legally 
binding minimum wage in the host State, trade unions (and indeed employers) 
could not legally enforce any agreements guaranteeing a higher, negotiated 
“going” rate.  
The Directive, in Article 3(10), allows Member States to apply to cross-
border service providers terms and conditions of employment on matters 
other than those specified in Article 3(1) in the case of “public policy 
provisions” (as long as these are applied equally to domestic workers). In 
Commission v Luxembourg66 the issue revolved around what constituted 
“public policy” under the Directive. Luxembourg had implemented the 
Directive in such a manner that considered virtually all “laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions and those resulting from collective agreements 
which have been declared universally applicable or an arbitration decision 
with a scope similar to that of universally applicable collective agreements” to 
constitute mandatory provisions falling under national public policy.67 This 
included, for example, the requirement of an automatic adjustment to rates of 
pay to reflect changes in the cost of living. According to the ECJ, the public 
policy exception was a derogation from the fundamental freedom to provide 
services and, so, must be interpreted strictly and relied on only if there is a 
genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society. As 
a result, Member States could not rely on the public policy exception in order 
to apply to undertakings posting staff on its territory the requirement relating to 
the automatic adjustment of wages, other than minimum wages, to reflect 
changes in the cost of living. 
These cases have provoked much comment, as they seem to restrict 
the power of Member States and, particularly, trade unions to enforce against 
cross-border service providers negotiated terms and conditions of 
employment that exceed statutory minima68 and where these refer to terms 
and conditions of employment in areas other than those specified under 
Article 3(1) (notice periods or grievance and disciplinary rules, for example).69 
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Barnard has noted that this reflects the “single market approach” of the CJEU, 
which sees the application of national labour law by a host state as a barrier 
to the provision of services under Article 56TFEU and therefore presumptively 
unlawful. This contrasts with the “labour law” perspective traditionally adopted 
by Ireland, the UK, and a number of other Member States, which seeks to 
apply national labour rules to all those working in the national territory in the 
name of equality, fairness and, crucially, good industrial relations70 and which 
relies, to an appreciable extent, on monitoring by the social partners.  
The decisions in the “Laval Quartet” were handed down prior to the 
coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which grants binding legal status to 
the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights.71 Article 28 of the Charter states: 
 
Workers and employers, or their respective organisations, have, in 
accordance with Union law and national laws and practices, the right to 
negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels 
and, in cases of conflicts of interests, to take collective action to defend 
their interests, including strike action. 
 
It had been suggested that the legally binding status of Article 28, post-
Lisbon, might encourage the CJEU to adopt a different approach to the 
protections to be afforded collective bargaining under EU law.72 Recent 
judgments from the CJEU indicate this will not be the case. In Commission v 
Germany73 at issue was whether a practice by which local authorities awarded 
contracts for pension services, without a call for tenders, on the basis of the 
selection criteria agreed under collective agreements violated EU public 
procurement directives.74 The CJEU held Germany had infringed the EU 
public procurement rules and ruled that, in accordance with the public 
procurement Directives, a call for tender must be advertised at EU level. The 
CJEU held that: 
 
…while it is true that the right to bargain collectively enjoys 
constitutional protection under the German Basic Law, the fact remains 
that, as provided in Article 28 of the Charter, that right must be 
exercised in accordance with European Law. 
 
Exercise of the fundamental right to bargain collectively must therefore 
be reconciled with the requirements stemming from the freedoms 
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protected by the FEU Treaty, which in the present instance Directives 
92/50 and 2004/18 are intended to implement and be in accordance 
with the principle of proportionality.75 
 
The Court concluded that the proportionality test had not been 
satisfied, and so the fundamental rights to bargain collectively, and to 
autonomy in collective bargaining, did not justify the effective non-application 
of the directives.  
 
Conclusion 
This article began by instancing a series of developments, which have 
served to weaken the scope for collective regulation of the Irish labour market. 
The challenges to the JLC system, culminating in the John Grace decision in 
2011, provide another chapter to this tale. The publication of the Industrial 
Relations Amendment Bill (No 3) 2011, which seeks to reconstitute the 
system, may provide a rare counterbalance to prevailing trends. As noted 
above, however, doubts exist as to whether the Bill will, in fact, successfully 
reinstate terms and conditions of employment, bargained by the social 
partners, that exceed the “floors” laid down in protective employment 
legislation. It seems as likely that a drift towards minimum standards will 
continue, and that the rights of workers in low-paid JLC sectors will need to be 
enforced by a stretched and under-resourced labour inspectorate.  
It has been argued that the Irish situation, moreover, is in harmony with 
the approach taken by the CJEU to collectively bargained standards, where 
these interfere with fundamental market freedoms under the Treaties. The 
judgments in the “Laval Quartet” and subsequent cases have sparked much 
debate about the balance between economic and social rights under EU law. 
The Monti report of 2010 proposed two legislative initiatives to try and address 
the issues and concerns raised by trade unions and others about the status of 
collective bargaining rights under EU law.76 First, a “concrete” measure, to 
clarify and improve the implementation of the Posting of Workers Directive 
and, secondly, a “normative” measure, to better coordinate the interaction 
between social rights and economic freedoms within the EU system.77 The 
Commission is due to bring forward its legislative proposals in early 2012.  
It is submitted here that a reversal of the shift to regulation of the labour 
market by way of statutory minima, which must be enforced by individual 
workers taking claims to employment tribunals, is required and that regulation 
based on bargained standards between employer and employee 
representative groups must be supported. The issues discussed in this article 
are, of course, hugely significant for workers, employers and other labour 
market actors. However, they also touch on fundamental questions about the 
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future direction of economy and society at both domestic and EU level. This 
view is based on a number of factors.  
First, bargained standard setting is of particular pertinence to low-paid 
sectors where vulnerable workers tend to be concentrated. Such sectors are 
typically characterised by low levels of trade union organisation, and relatively 
high numbers of migrant workers, young people, and part-time and casual 
workers, with little or no individual bargaining power. These are precisely the 
sectors (retail, cleaning, hotels) covered by JLCs (and, indeed, with the 
addition of construction, the sectors in which posted workers tend to be 
congregated). As Duffy and Walsh note, for “unskilled workers in a large 
European labour market with free mobility of labour it is unlikely that the 
market mechanism will provide…adequate protection”.78 Removal of the 
protections of a JLC system (which, recall, has traditionally provided minimum 
standards higher than legislative floors in terms of pay and working time and 
has provided for bargained benefits, such as sick pay, for which there exists 
no statutory provision) would be likely to have seriously detrimental social 
consequences for many already low-paid workers, and would 
disproportionately affect certain categories of workers, such as migrant 
workers and women. Workers in these sectors are unlikely to have the 
potential to bargain individually with employers and are, consequently, more 
amenable to succumbing to pressure to accept inferior working terms and 
conditions.   
The situation might be otherwise were the option to have a trade union 
negotiate on their behalf open to such workers. However, given the extremely 
restrictive nature of Ireland’s trade union recognition laws, this opportunity is 
unlikely to arise.79 It is noteworthy that the 2011 Bill does not take up the 
recommendation in the Duffy-Walsh report that individual employers, or 
groups of employers, could apply pay and conditions below those stipulated in 
an ERO, provided that they were agreed under a collective agreement arrived 
at through a process of collective bargaining, as defined by either Article 28 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights or under ILO conventions.80 It has been 
suggested that this recommendation was not taken up due to fears of the 
consequences of introducing a statutory definition of “collective bargaining” 
into Irish law, which would replace the much-criticised Supreme Court 
definition in the Ryanair case,81 and which could have ramifications beyond 
the JLC issue.82  
Secondly, at EU level, it has been noted that the jurisprudence on 
collectively bargained standards “has the potential to alienate from the Single 
Market and the EU a segment of public opinion, workers' movements and 
trade unions, which has been over time a key supporter of economic 
integration”.83 It is contended that it is not simply workers’ movements that are 
disconcerted by a potential “race to the bottom” in terms of working terms and 
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conditions and social protection, but that the current economic climate has 
engendered a much more widespread public suspicion of greater market 
integration measures at EU level, which for many, is “code for dismantling 
social rights protected at national level”.84 In Ireland, the role played by EU 
institutions in the context of the economic crisis and, in particular, the terms of 
the economic support package has clearly damaged public support for the EU 
project.85 It has been noted above that the terms of the support package have 
been central to the JLC reform agenda, by requiring a review of Irish wage-
setting mechanisms. In an extraordinary intervention, however, in January 
2012, it was announced that the “Troika” of the European Commission, IMF 
and European Central Bank, have sought an amendment of the 2011 Bill, to 
allow employers who get temporary “inability to pay” exemptions of less than 
two years to seek extensions of those exemptions, for up to two years. The 
requested change, in itself, is relatively minor, although it does represent 
support for a minimalist position in terms of what pay rates future JLCs will 
deliver, but the “micro-managing” of the details of the legislation is 
significant.86 Such moves are unlikely to buttress waning support for EU 
institutions. Failure to protect the pay and conditions of vulnerable workers, 
similarly, is unlikely to contribute to social cohesion and popular support for 
national or international institutions in an era of crisis.   
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